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Abstract. Passports are now equipped with RFID chips that contain private information, biometric data,
and a digital signature by issuing authorities. We review most of applicable security and privacy issues. We
argue that the main privacy issue is not unauthorized access through radio channel or data skimming as
claimed before, but rather the leakage of a digital signature by government authorities for private data. To
fix this, we rather need the e-passport to prove the knowledge of a valid signature in a non-transferable way.
Besides, several identification protocols such as GPS identification in RFID could lead to challenge seman-
tics attacks that are privacy threats. To fix this, we also need some kind of non-transferability.
In 2003, Steinfeld et al. proposed the universal designated-verifier signature (UDVS) primitive. Its drawback
is in demanding verifiers to have public keys authenticated by the passport. One compromise was proposed
by Baek et al. with the UDVSP primitive. We show that UDVSP does not provide non-transferability and
fix it by using zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. We propose a simple method to protect Σ-protocols
against offline Mafia fraud and challenge semantics. We apply this by proposing a simple protocol based on
Guillou-Quisquater identification that only requires two RSA computations and would substantially enhance
the privacy of the e-passport bearer.
1 Introduction
So far, the travel documents we are familiar with are based on low technology: hard-to-copy/forge
printed paper with an ID picture. The UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has been
working on making them machine readable since 1968. There is now a discrete machine-readable
zone (MRZ) which can be optically scanned by a machine. This MRZ contains little information and
is mostly aimed at speeding up inspection at border controls. Since 1980, ICAO works on adding more
machine-readable information. In particular, biometrics would be used to have a more automatic and
secure people identification protocol. The standard was released in 2004. As minimal requirements,
Machine-Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) must provide a facial image, a digital copy of the
MRZ, and to have them digitally signed by the issuing country. The preferred platform is a contactless
IC chip based on RFID technology.
Obviously, the goal of this effort is to strengthen security at border controls. Of course, one danger
would be that security officers rely too much on automatic identification and control. This would be
counterproductive for security since passport copies of low quality with clones of IC chips would
pass security control more easily. At the same time, the use of embedded digital biometric data opens
the Pandora box and could threaten humankind: machines would trace people and humans would
have to fight very hard against errors in databases or machine errors. For instance, the advent of
video surveillance together with automatic face recognition jeopardizes the legitimate right to stay
anonymous in a crowd. More dramatically, if criminal organizations can no longer steal identities
without genuine fingers, they will start cutting fingers. This is what happened with biometric car lock
systems.
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Despite (and thanks to) privacy lobbies, the standard is now being deployed with facial image as
the (only) biometric data. In addition to this, the EU has just extended this standard to accommodate
fingerprint and iris images protected by a more secure access control protocol. In 2007, this extension
is being implemented.
So far, researchers concentrated on demonstrating that unauthorized radio access to the chip and
passive eavesdropping are feasible (although not technically straightforward). Our position is that the
privacy threat coming from radio technology is not so important compared to having digital informa-
tion released. In particular, having private information such as “official” name, gender and birth date
digitally signed could be some valuable information which could be sold and threaten the privacy of
people. People considering their age as the most sensitive private data would face to non-repudiable
proof of it published in newspapers or put in databases. Transsexuals would also mind having a proof
of there official gender released.
To solve this, we propose to use a cryptographic primitive that makes it possible to authenticate
data without leaking any transferable proof. We build our primitive based on a zero-knowledge (with
malicious verifier) proof of knowledge. Our aim is mainly to provide a proof of concept rather than a
formal cryptographic study of a new primitive. For this reason, we do not aim at entering too much
into the cryptographic technicality but rather to propose a concrete and easy protocol. Formal analysis
will be subject of a subsequent study.
Previous work. The first research paper about the concept of e-passport by Davida and Desmedt [10,11]
ages from 1988.
In [1], Avoine and Oechslin discussed information leakage from various communication layer
protocols, including the singulation protocol for RFID. ISO 14443 recommends that RFID chips in-
troduce themselves by using a random identification number that is used for collision avoidance only.
In 2005, Juels, Molnar and Wagner [27] presented a survey on MRTD and RFID. Among other is-
sues, they discussed about the “biometric threat” and shortcomings in the Basic Access Control (BAC)
protocol. In 2006, Hoepman et al. [23] discussed more about unauthorized access and skimming over
the BAC protocol. They studied the entropy of the MRZ info access key. They also discussed about
the EU Extended Access Control (EAC). They detailed a revocation issue related to terminal authen-
tication. They further discussed on biometrics. An experimental attack based on the BAC weaknesses
was reported in 2006 by Hancke [22] and Carluccio et al. [6]. In 2006, Lehtonen et al. [28] studied
ways to make optical memory and contactless IC chip interact for the benefit of security.
Non-transferability concerns were originally raised in the context of undeniable signatures [7]
(also called invisible signature). The verification of such signatures is done interactively with the
signer and should only convince the legitimate verifier. Later, the notion of designated confirmer sig-
nature of Chaum [8] allowed the invisible signature to be proven online by a designated third party
called the confirmer. In order to cope with some attacks [13,24] allowing a malicious verifier to con-
vince other non-legitimate parties, Jakobsson et al. [25] introduced some so-called designated verifier
signatures which can only convince a designated verifier. As a price to pay, these techniques require
the introduction of a pair of keys associated to the legitimate verifier. To the best of our knowledge,
a formal (simulation-based) definition of the non-transferability was first proposed by Camenisch-
Michels [5] for designated confirmer signatures. In the standard model, this definition (and subsequent
variants) can be seen as a stronger (online) variant of black-box zero-knowledge against malicious
verifiers.
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Our contribution. In this paper we first survey the standards and reported security and privacy is-
sues.3 Our thesis is that research papers overlooked the main privacy threat: potential leakage of digi-
tal evidence. Finally, we discuss potential cryptographic solutions to replace digital signatures whose
transferable property is a privacy issue. In between the extreme cases of traditional signatures (which
are fully transferable) and of Universal Designated-Verifier Signature (UDVS) by Steinfeld et al. [34]
(which are strongly non-transferable but require a heavy PKI on the verifier side), there is the pro-
posal of UDVS Proof (UDVSP) by Baek et al. [2]. We show this does not achieve non-transferability.
We propose a new protocol which is non-transferable after the protocol completed and does not re-
quire any public-key infrastructure on the verifier side. Our protocol can also nicely replace active
authentication that also leaks.
2 The ICAO Standard
ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, started to work on Machine-Readable Travel
Documents (MRTD) in 1968. The first MRTD standard was issued in 1980. It proposes a standard
Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) consisting of two lines with basic information about the document
holder. This MRZ is aimed at being read by an optical scanner. Basically, the MRZ contains: the doc-
ument type (e.g. “passport”), the issuing country code, the holder name, the document number, the
nationality of the holder, his date of birth, his gender, the expiry date of the document, and several op-
tions which are left up to the issuing country. Here is a (forged) example of MRZ for Mr Jean Dupont,
born on April 1st 1973, citizen of France with a passport number 74HK8215 issued by Switzerland
(is he a refugee?) expiring on May 12 2007:
PMFRADUPONT<<<<JEAN<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
74HK8215<6CHE7304017M0705121<<<<<<<<<<<<<<03
In 1980, the new-technology working group of ICAO started to work on biometrics. After 2001
9/11, the standardization process was boosted in order to have more security at the border control. In
2002, members decided to adopt facial recognition as the mandatory biometric and let finger and eye
recognition as optional ones. The reason why they adopted face recognition is that giving a picture
is already socially and culturally accepted by most of people worldwide. It is not intrusive, it does
not require physical contact. Deployment is pretty easy. Enrolment is feasible from sample pictures
and the holder (in particular: children) do not have to be present. Finally, human verification is still
possible if the software crashes.
In 2003, members decided to focus on contactless IC chip as main support. The reason is that
it requires no contact, unlike magnetic strip or contact IC chip. Furthermore, it offers large random
access memory capacity compared to 2D barcodes. ICAO recommends to have at least 32KB memory
and is pushing to 512KB so that many other applications can be installed.
Version 1 of the standard was issued in 2004. The technical part is detailed in two main documents:
one about the Logical Data Structure (LDS) to be stored, the operating system, and the communication
protocol to the IC chip [29], the other (called the PKI Technical Document) about the cryptographic
aspects [30]. In this paper, we refer to these documents as the ICAO standard. These are technical
reports that are aimed as being incorporated in future versions of Document 9303, the normative
ICAO document about MRTD.
E-passports implementing the ICAO standard can be distinguished as they have the following logo
printed on the cover:
3 See [37] for a more complete survey.
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The ICAO standard mandates the use of a digital picture (for facial recognition) and the MRZ as
private information about the holder. It also mandates the use of PKI and digital signature to authen-
ticate this digital information: this is the so-called passive authentication.
Several optional security protocols are offered by the ICAO standard.
– The so-called Basic Access Control (BAC) is used for reader access control and key agreement
between the reader and the IC chip. A secure messaging protocol is then used for further commu-
nication. This protects the communication channel. The key agreement authenticates the reader
to the IC chip based on the knowledge of the MRZ info. This data is extracted from the MRZ.
It consists of the document number, the date of birth and the expiry date (that is: the 74HK821 ,
730401 and 070512 strings in our MRZ example). BAC is only based on the DES algorithm in
encryption (2-key triple DES) and authentication (CBCMAC with a first key ended by a 2-key
triple DES) mode. BAC is used to make sure that the reader has seen the MRZ, presumably by
having the document given and opened by the holder for inspection. The goal of BAC is to prevent
from unauthorized access and from passive eavesdropping (aka skimming).
– A so-called Extended Access Control (EAC) is left open to members by ICAO, but not standard-
ized. Usage of EAC is up to bilateral agreements between members.
– The so-called Active Authentication (AA) is used to authenticate the chip to the reader. It uses
public-key cryptography and proves that the chip is genuine. Namely, the public-key of the IC chip
is authenticated as part of the passive authentication, and a challenge-response protocol proves that
the chip holds a secret key related to the public key.
In addition to this, the IC chip must follow RFID standard ISO 14443. This means that it introduces
itself by releasing an ID number to run a singulation protocol. To prevent from being traced, IC chips
may use a random number.
The LDS document defines several LDS files called Data Groups (DG) from EF.DG1 to EF.DG19.
Data group EF.DG1 is the digital version of the MRZ. Data group EF.DG2 is a facial digital picture
which is optimized for automatic face recognition. These are the only mandatory data groups. Data
group EF.DG15 is the public key of the chip if AA is implemented. Some other data groups can
accommodate templates for digital fingerprint, iris image, written signature and other personal in-
formation (e.g. the place of birth, etc). Data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG15 must be authenticated by
means of passive authentication. To do so, the hash of all data groups is listed in an extra file EF.SOD
called Security Object for the Document (SOD). This file also contains a formatted digital signature
of this list. It can also contain the certificate of the Document Signer (DS) by the issuing country. If
not present, this certificate can be obtained only from the ICAO public-key directory. Each country
maintains its own PKI. It must send a self-signed certificate of its root certificate authority to all coun-
tries by diplomatic means, all certificates to the ICAO directory, and all certificate revocation list to
all countries frequently or when needed. Data group EF.DG16 (which is not authenticated) contains
the contact person to notify (presumably for the travel documents of children or persons requiring
assistance). Other data groups are left for visiting countries to store electronic visa, automatic border
clearance, or travel records.
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Based on our own experiment and first-hand information, we have observed the e-passport char-
acteristics on Table 1 for various countries. Note that characteristics can evolve in time. For instance,
Belgian e-passports have switched from no BAC to BAC in 2006.
– As far as we know, only the USA use a metallic cover as a shield to the chip. This protects privacy
(but rings at security gates).
– Following the ISO 14443B Part 3 standard, all RFID chips with random identifiers use a 32-bit
number of format 08xxxxxx . People deduce that an identifier starting with byte 08 means that the
RFID chip is privacy sensitive and a potential target for adversaries. For that reasons, Australia
decided to adopt a random 32-bit strings of arbitrary format. As a consequence, always changing
identifiers not starting with 08 means that the RFID chip is likely to be the one of an Australian e-
passport. As for US e-passports, we have heard contradicting first-hand information about whether
they use a random identifier (like the Australian case) of a constant one. Thanks to the shield, using
a constant identifier is a minor point though.
– Similarly, we have heard contradicting information regarding whether US e-passports use BAC or
not.
– As far as we know, only Czech e-passports use active authentication.
So far, we have not seen any biometrics except facial images but this is likely to change pretty fast.
Indeed, the Swiss government has announced in June 2007 that a new generation of e-passport with
fingerprints will be released in 2009, conditioned to the Schengen agreements with Switzerland to be
ratified by the EU. Presumably, all e-passports in the Schengen area will use EAC with fingerprints
soon.
Table 1. Characteristics of E-Passports by Countries. (In boldface is what we have observed ourselves. Other information is
first-hand information.)
shield singulation BAC AA
Switzerland none random 08xxxxxx used not implemented
United Kingdom none random 08xxxxxx used not implemented
France none random 08xxxxxx ? ?
Australia none random xxxxxxxx used ?
New Zealand none constant used ?
USA yes ? ? ?
Italy ? constant ? ?
Belgium none ? used implemented
Czech Republic none random 08xxxxxx used implemented
Similarly, we had a look at public-key algorithms. We have 3 types of algorithms: the signing
algorithm of the DS certificate; the signature algorithm of DS for the SOD; the signature algorithm in
the active authentication. What we have seen is reported on Table 2. For instance, Switzerland uses
ECDSA over P-256 (aka secp256r1 [15,33]) to sign the SOD. P-256 has an order close to 2256.
3 Security and Privacy Failures in the ICAO Standard
3.1 Radio Frequency Issues
So far, most of the academic effort to analyze the security of the ICAO standard concentrated on the
consequences of having a contactless device. We review reported weaknesses here.
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Table 2. Signature Algorithms (with signature length).
certificate SOD AA
Switzerland ecdsa with sha1 (824b) ecdsa (512b) n/a
United Kingdom sha256withRSA (4096b) RSA (2048b) n/a
Czech Republic rsaPSS (3072b) (using sha1) RSA (2048b) RSA (1024b)
Belgium sha1withRSA (4096b) RSA (2048b) ?
Germany ecdsa with sha1 (560b) ecdsa (464b) n/a
Italy sha1withRSA (4096b) RSA (2048b) ?
New-Zealand sha256withRSA (4096b) RSA (2048b) ?
USA sha256withRSA (4096b) RSA (2048b) ?
Singulation. Some passports using a constant 32-bit RFID identifier (e.g. those from Italy or New-
Zealand) can be tracked. Most of tested passports generate 32-bit random numbers starting with byte
08 for singulation as specified in ISO 14443B Part 3. As already mentioned, this can be used by
adversary to identify the presence of an RFID with privacy enhancement which is likely to be an e-
passport (at least some device having something to hide). Interestingly, Australia stepped out from the
standard by deciding to start with a random byte instead. Clearly, this can further identify the presence
of an Australian passport, the only RFID device behaving by announcing an ever changing random
number not starting with byte 08 . We can thus trace people holding such a passport.
Privacy in RFID singulation is actually a big issue (see [1]). Even if an undistinguishable protocol
is used, hardware always leaks due to radiation pattern signatures (see e.g. [21]). Ideally, all RFID
devices should use the same hardware and follow the same protocol with the same implementation to
avoid leakage, but this is clearly unrealistic.
Basic Access Control. BAC is the most documented security failure. Indeed, there is no free lunch.
From an academic point of view, one-way primitives are not known to be sufficient to design any
secure key agreement protocol [32]. When a key agreement based on weakly private information (such
as MRZ info) uses no public-key cryptography, it is vulnerable against online or offline bruteforce
attacks. (See e.g. [27].) This is the same as for Bluetooth pairing [26,36].
The entropy of MRZ info could ideally be of 70 bits (it contains a string of 9 alphanumerical
characters, a date of birth with a 2-digit year, and a date of expiry for a document aimed at being valid
for up to 10 years). In practice, it is much lower due to the passport numbering scheme which is being
used by countries (see [23]). Hence, bruteforce attacks can be implemented as detailed in [6]. Based
on that, online bruteforce attacks against a passport can be done. One experiment which took 4h was
reported. One scenario where this kind of attack would make sense is during a long haul flight when
an adversary wants to steal the private information of his neighbor. A passive adversary listening to the
radio communication between a legitimate reader and the IC chip can also run an offline exhaustive
search. In [22], the online attack was shown to be feasible at a distance of 1.5m while the offline attack
was done a the longer distance of 4m. These attacks are further claimed to be feasible at a distance of
10m.
BAC was meant to protect against unauthorized access and skimming attacks. Our discussion
shows that it does not complete its task.
Clearly, by replacing the key agreement protocol by the Diffie-Hellman protocol [14] or any other
decent key agreement protocol, adversaries would no longer be able to decrypt private information
by offline bruteforce. However, offline bruteforce would still reveal MRZ info which is private as it
contains a date of birth and a document number. To avoid that, a secure password-based authenticated
key exchange protocol would be needed.
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3.2 Other Privacy Issues
Although we believe that weaknesses due to the wireless link are real threats, we find that the impact
of these problems is over-estimated compared to many privacy issues which are direct consequences
of the overall philosophy of the ICAO standard. Indeed, unauthorized access or skimming is techno-
logically hard to perform. Collecting data from authorized access to a document such as in a hotel
check-in desk or in a duty free shop is much easier and threatening as detailed below.
Passive Authentication. The overall concept of passive authentication is a big loss for privacy. So
far, data authentication is only based on a digital signature on private information. One problem with
digital signatures is that they are transferable. Someone having access to the passport of someone else
can not only get private information (what anybody would clearly assume) but also a proof of it. This
proof can later be exhibited.
It is widely accepted to have to show a proof of identity, for instance at a hotel check-in desk,
in department stores for duty free shopping, or at the cashier of a supermarket to buy some wine. A
passport is a proof by itself. In hotels, it is further accepted that one copy of the passport will be kept.
However, a copy of a passport is not a proof because it can easily be falsified. Hence, the passport
holder can deny information based on this copy by claiming the copy was forged. People can thus
continue to hide their age if they want to. Traditional passports are to some extend non-transferable
proofs. With e-passports, the copy of the digital content with a certified signature is a transferable
proof. Its semantic content can no longer be denied.
We believe that digital signature is clearly not the good way to authenticate data. To replace this,
we propose to use some Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof of knowledge of a valid signature. We could
still have online transferability if the reader is playing the Mafia fraud attack (aka relay attack) [12].
To thwart this, one could even use more powerful non-transferable proofs but this would require a
tedious public-key infrastructure for readers. Using ZK proofs at least ensures some kind of offline
non-transferability. Such alternative protocols are discussed in Section 5.
Biometric templates in LDS. Disclosing biometric templates to help the reader to identify someone
is also a big privacy threat. Contrarily to what people argue, disclosing the mandatory EF.DG2 file
(the facial digital picture) is not the same as showing a small printed picture on the document. A first
difference is that the digital picture is digital. As being such, it can be copied forever without any
loss of quality. The second difference is that the picture is optimized for automatic face recognition.
This means that a duty free shop can download the biometric picture and later install an automatic
face surveillance control. A customer entering again would be automatically identified and his profile
and previous shopping list would automatically appear to the vendor. This would indeed be a valuable
information for the vendor willing to sell more.
As already documented, disclosing fingerprint templates is a privacy threat. The only way to avoid
IC chips disclosing biometric information would be to implement on-board matching. The IC chip
could identify its own holder. A challenging remaining problem would be to design a protocol that
proves to the reader that the biometric templates did match.
Challenge semantics. The Active Authentication (AA) protocol basically consists, for the IC chip,
in signing a random challenge provided by the reader. The signature is a proof of knowledge of the
secret key that is attached to the public key that is itself authenticated from the LDS. Although pretty
simple and secure from the perspective of the targeted MRTD functionality, this protocol has a quite
surprising and terrible privacy problem as discussed in [35]. Indeed, the reader can put semantics in
the challenge that will be gently signed by the IC chip. For instance, the challenge could consist of a
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time-dependent social information at the time of the challenge (e.g. the current stock exchange rates,
all collected press releases, etc) together with links to previous timestamps. Then a timestamp on the
IC chip response would be a digital proof that the MRTD was examined at the given time.
An alternate solution for active authentication is already well known in the cryptography com-
munity since 1986: we can indeed use zero-knowledge identification such as the Fiat-Shamir proto-
col [16]. More recently, the GPS protocol [18] was shown to be pretty easy to implement on RFID
devices [4,17]. This will be discussed in Section 5 as well.
4 The EU Extended Access Control
4.1 EAC Specifications
Pushed by privacy concerns related to biometric information, the EU has launched the development
of a common Extended Access Control (EAC) to protect private data against unauthorized access.
Despite our discussion from Section 3.2 about automatic surveillance abuse, it makes the distinction
between “less-sensitive data” such as the MRZ and the facial image and “sensitive data” such as
fingerprints. Nevertheless, the EU is likely to lobby for the ICAO to replace BAC by EAC in the
future so even “less sensitive” data may benefit from this stronger protocol, eventually.
EAC accommodates a reader authentication based on an extra PKI. In clear, countries with bilat-
eral agreements will be able to go through EAC (after having done BAC and checked mandatory face
and MRZ data), to access to fingerprint and iris images. Countries without bilateral agreements will
still be able to use BAC and get MRZ and facial image.
EAC is being implemented in 2007 based on the first version [35].
EAC consists of chip authentication and terminal authentication. Both must be used to treat sen-
sitive private data. Terminal authentication must be used together with chip authentication. Chip au-
thentication can be used alone, in particular as a possible replacement for AA as it prevents from the
challenge semantics issues. In addition to this, chip authentication offers an extra key agreement (that
is better than BAC) to be used for secure messaging. Chip authentication in EAC could thus replace
BAC and AA at the same time and reach better security.
The PKI for terminals is similar as the PKI for MRTD except for the validity period which is much
shorter. A certificate for a back-end terminal shall range between 1 day and 1 month. This protects
against unauthorized access with stolen terminals. Unfortunately (as mentioned in [35]), the IC chip
has no reliable clock. Hence, a stolen reader with expired certificate can still claim to have a valid
one by giving an expired time. The chip could keep record of past given time to check that time is
increasing, but this only protects frequent travelers.
Chip authentication is based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol [14]. It thus protects against passive
skimming. The chip uses a static Diffie-Hellman public key while the reader shall use an ephemeral
one. As the public key of the chip is authenticated by passive authentication, the key agreement is
semi-authenticated in the sense that it authenticated the chip to the reader. The agreed key is later used
in secure messaging. Note that chip authentication is implicit. It becomes explicit as the chip is later
able to run secure messaging.
Terminal authentication follows the same principles as AA in a reversed way: the IC chip chal-
lenges the reader who gently signs the challenge. The challenge is signed together with the hash of
the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key to authenticate the key agreement in the other way. Clearly,
this can suffer from challenge semantics. The MRTD could get a proof that a given terminal did talk
to the chip. It is claimed that readers are not concerned about privacy.
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4.2 EAC Issues
Forward secrecy. Despite the claim that key agreement achieves forward secrecy, we obviously have
a semi-forward secrecy: if the IC chip is corrupted so that the static Diffie-Hellman secret key leaks,
communications can be decrypted.
Leakage of digests. Although EAC makes its best to protect sensitive data by a stronger access control,
some content of the LDS can be recovered after BAC without passing EAC. Namely, the EF.SOD file
is released after BAC. It contains the hashes of each data group, including sensitive ones. Hence,
even though some fingerprint template is not released, the hash of it is given as a sketch. Since the
terminal is likely to capture a probe that is likely to be close to the template, depending on the mutual
information between the probe and the template, the sensitive template can be obtained by bruteforce.
Similarly, every data group for which the reader has a clue can be recovered. Obviously, this
lacks semantic security: the reader can identify the right guess for sensitive data groups based on the
EF.SOD data.
A quick dirty fix would consist in adding a random number in the sensitive data groups but it
would be safer to think about using two levels of EF.SOD: one for less-sensitive data and one for
sensitive ones.
Other issues. Finally, other problems such as offline bruteforce on MRZ info in BAC, unauthorized
download of MRZ and facial image based on MRZ info, skimming of MRZ and facial image, possible
leakage of transferable digital evidence, and possible leakage of biometric templates remain unsolved.
5 Non-Transferable Data Authentication
5.1 On Non-Transferable Proof of Signature Knowledge
The Mafia fraud [12] is an online transfer of an interactive proof that is a privacy threat. When an hon-
est prover (the victim) must prove something to a verifier, the malicious verifier may try to transfer the
proof to the Mafia. To do so, the verifier acts as a relay between the prover and the Mafia. To prevent
from this attack, it is necessary that the prover authenticates the verifier and that the proof is dedicated
to him. Techniques achieving this require the use of a public-key infrastructure on the verifier side.
Verifiers are authenticated by proving that they hold a secret key attached to an authenticated public
one. The key idea of non-transferable proofs consists of proving that either the statement is true or
that the secret key of the verifier is known. Therefore, when the malicious verifier tries to transfer the
proof to the Mafia this is no longer a proof of statement because it could have been forged with his
secret key.
A Universal Designated-Verifier Signature (UDVS) was proposed by Steinfeld et al. [34]. Follow-
ing this primitive, a signer (e.g. the document signer in the MRTD framework) can provide a signature
to a prover (e.g. the IC chip of the MRTD). Then, the prover can prove his knowledge for a valid sig-
nature to any verifier with authenticated public key (e.g. the inspection device) in such a way that the
proof cannot be transfered to anyone else.
The public-key requirement is a burden on the technology. One compromise would be to live
with the Mafia fraud attack that is merely an online transfer proof but to make sure that no proof
can be transfered when the protocol has been completed. This would define a weaker form of non-
transferability but would be achievable without any PKI for verifiers. That is, the prover who partici-
pates to the proof protocol may prove a statement (in our case, the knowledge of a valid signature) to
someone who may not be the person in front of him (or even to several persons) but is assured that the
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statement cannot be proven by anyone else after the protocol is over. Namely, no proof can be posted
in newspapers or stored as digital evidence.
Baek et al. [2] proposed an interactive UDVS Proof (UDVSP) with this objective in mind. One
problem with their construction is that their security definition does not catch their objectives. In-
deed, a malicious verifier following their proposed proof protocols could convert the interactive proof
into a non-interactive one following the standard Fiat-Shamir techniques [16]. The proposed UDVSP
schemes use Σ-protocols: protocols where the prover first sends a commitment, then the verifier sends
a challenge selected in a pretty large set, and the prover responds so that the verifier can check whether
the response is consistent with the document, commitment, and challenge. To convert the proof into a
signature, the malicious verifier would use a random oracle fed with the document and commitment
from the prover. Its output would initialize the random tape of the verifier. Then he would simulate
the verifier algorithm and generate the challenge. The commitment and response would later become
a universally verifiable signature of the document by having access to the random oracle. The verifi-
cation scheme of the signature would simply consist in simulating the last step of the verifier with the
given commitment and response. We can easily show that this signature is unforgeable if the challenge
set is large enough. Indeed, no Σ-protocol can be ZK with a malicious verifier. (See [9].) We can best
hope for honest-verifier ZK but this is not enough for non-transferability.
The problem in the [2] result is that they define their special form of non-transferability by the
non-ability for an adversary to run the interactive proof again with a honest verifier. In our attack,
the adversary does not run the interactive proof but convinces anyone for the validity of the signa-
ture by other means: a new verification algorithm. This does not contradict the [2] result but merely
disprove that it offers any reasonable form of offline-transferability. Indeed, the definition of [2] for
non-transferability is too weak. Here, we adopt a (weak) notion of non-transferability that comes for
free with ZK proofs which are ZK with malicious verifiers: protocol transcripts using any verifier can
be simulated so the proof gives no advantage to a malicious verifier.
When [2] was presented at Asiacrypt’05, Marc Girault made the comment that the proof of
knowledge for an RSA signature [31] could easily be done using the Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) proto-
col [19,20]. Unfortunately, this could also be converted the same way since it is another Σ-protocol.
Indeed, the GQ protocol is not known to be ZK. It is “only” known to be Honest-Verifier ZK (HVZK)
and to resist impersonation under active and concurrent attack (see Bellare-Palacio [3]).
Protocols such as GPS [18] that could be used to replace AA are other (HVZK) Σ-protocols.
Converting them into signature schemes could lead to other challenge semantics issues. To solve this
issue, we propose to start Σ-protocols with a commitment from the verifier. The next section applies
to the GQ and GPS protocols.
5.2 GQ-Based Proof of Signature and GPS-Based Identification
A fix to the GQ protocol would work as follows (see Figure 1). We assume that the prover holds an
RSA signature x for a formated document digest X with public key (N,e) and secret key d. The prover
wants to prove to the verifier his knowledge of x satisfying xe mod N = X .
1. The verifier picks a random cV of ` bits and commits to it by sending a commit value γ to the
prover.
2. The prover picks a random y in Z∗N and a random cP of ` bits and sends Y = ye mod N and cP to
the verifier.
3. The verifier releases a decommit value δ to open cV .
4. The prover opens the commitment and gets cV then sends z = yxc mod N to the prover where
c = cP⊕ cV .
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5. The prover checks that ze ≡ Y Xc (mod N).
A quick and dirty commitment would consist of picking a random string δ and committing by γ =
H(cV ,δ) given a hash function H (ideally: a random oracle). The decommit value would be δ.
Prover Verifier
formated digest: X public key: N,e formated digest: X
signature: x
pick y ∈ Z∗N pick cV ∈ {0,1}`
pick cP ∈ {0,1}` γ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (γ,δ)← commit(cV )
Y ← ye mod N Y,cP−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
check(cV ,γ,δ)
δ,cV←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
z← yxc mod N z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check ze = Y Xc (mod N)
(c = cP⊕ cV )
Fig. 1. A (Weakly) Non-Transferable Proof of Signature Knowledge based on GQ.
Unsurprisingly, when we use a binding commitment, we can prove that the protocol is ZK with
malicious verifier by rewinding techniques. When we use a trapdoor commitment, we can prove that
it remains a proof of knowledge.
Note that our protocol only involves two RSA computations on the prover side. Indeed, this would
be similar as running two AA protocols on an MRTD.
To replace the AA protocol, we can simply use our proposed protocol with the message “I am
the chip of [MRZ]”. Owing a valid signature from the issuing authorities would assess the identity of
the IC chip. This interactive proof would no longer be subject to challenge semantic issues as being
(weakly) non-transferable. Another (more efficient) protocol would be based on GPS [18] (with a
single iteration) as shown on Figure 2.
Prover Verifier
parameters: g,A,B,S
public key: I input: I,g,A,B,S
secret key: s ∈ [0,S] (I = gs)
pick r ∈ [0,A−1] pick cV ∈ [0,B−1]
pick cP ∈ [0,B−1] γ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (γ,δ)← commit(cV )
x← gr x,cP−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
check(cV ,γ,δ)
δ,cV←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
y← r+ cs y−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check gy = xIc
(c = cP + cV mod B) and 0≤ y < A+(B−1)(S−1)
Fig. 2. A (Weakly) Non-Transferable Identification Proof based on GPS.
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6 Conclusion
In this survey on machine-readable travel documents, we have reviewed most of security and privacy
issues. Although the academic community mostly concentrated on unauthorized access form radio
frequency or communication skimming, we believe that the main threats are in the release of digital
evidence.
To solve the problem of passive authentication, we have proposed a scheme that makes it possible
to prove that the LDS is authentic without leaking any evidence that could later be used.
The privacy issue in singulation is not as trivial as it looks and would certainly deserve a unique
standard for RFID devices. If manufacturers adopt different standards, e-passports will always leak
the radio signature of their manufacturer.
The release of biometric information is a privacy threat that demands to develop a new primitive:
a proof of pattern matching that does not leak the original pattern.
Finally, we have shown several technical issues that would be easy to fix once spotted. Namely,
BAC should be based on password-based authenticated key exchange as already mentioned in [27].
AA should be replaced by a real ZK proof, just like for passive authentication. EAC that is aimed at
fixing the ICAO standard should stop leaking data group digests.
We hope that our result will contribute to reach a reasonable compromise between the security at
border controls and the privacy of people.
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